Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book examines the rich German tradition of irregular warfare. Increasingly, so-called weak actors employ irregular warfare to successfully challenge the strong. The British, French, and Americans are recognized for their irregular warfare experience, but the comparatively rich German tradition remains overlooked. German contributions to irregular warfare, in fact, rival their reputed expertise in modern maneuver warfare. This thesis surveys German irregular warfare cases from the eighteenth century forward. Beginning in the American Revolution, Hessian officer Johann Ewald revealed important counter-insurgency principles. In the early nineteenth century, Carl von Clausewitz spoke to the larger idea of people's war and noted its efficacy. In a peripheral theater of World War I, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck mastered the art of irregular adaptation and survival. In the Second World War, Otto Skorzeny perfected the strategic commando raid. After serving in the same war, Friedrich A.F. von der Heydte published a theory of modern irregular warfare, unique for its views on terrorism and the combined employment of irregular and other forms of warfare. Otto Heilbrunn studied partisan warfare and endorsed pseudo operations to counter asymmetric threats such as those faced by the United States today. German irregular warfare offers strategic answers to contemporary security challenges.
CHAPTER I * INTRODUCTION * A. WHAT IS IRREGULAR WARFARE? * B. THE GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE * C. GERMAN IRREGULAR WARRIORS SURVEYED * 1. Johann Ewald (1744-1813) * 2. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) * 3. Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870-1964) * 4. Otto Skorzeny (1908-1975) * 5. Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte (1907-1994) * 6. Otto Heilbrunn (1906-1969) * CHAPTER II * JOHANN EWALD: DIARIST OF IRREGULAR WAR * A. EWALD'S TREATISE IN CONTEXT * B. APPLIED PRINCIPLES * 1. Fight Lean * 2. Blend In * 3. Adapt Operations * 4. Make Friends * 5. Use Locals * 6. Stay Sharp * 7. Attack * 8. Turn Defense Into Offense * 9. Look for Opportunity * 10. Keep Your Enemies Close * 11. Never Underestimate * 12. Keep Learning * CHAPTER III * CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ * A. PERSONAL HISTORY * B. HISTORICAL INFLUENCES * C. LESSONS FROM CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS * 1. The French Insurrection * 2. The Tyrolean Rebellion * 3. The Spanish Insurrection * D. THEMES OF CLAUSEWITZ'S ON WAR * 1. Irregular Warfare as a Progressive Tactic * 2. Irregular Warfare as an Attainable State Goal * E. CRITICAL ASPECTS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE * 1. Wide Distribution of Forces * 2. Exploiting Terrain * 3. Pursuing Patience as a Strategy * 4. Maintaining Alliances * 5. Knowing Your Men * 6. Achieving Vapor and Vagary * 7. Recognizing Morale as Critical * 8. Resisting the Temptation to Despondency * CHAPTER IV * PAUL EMIL VON LETTOW-VORBECK * A. THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA * 1. Phase I: Harassment * 2. Phase II: Drawing the Enemy In * 3. Phase III: Tightening Operations * 4. Phase IV: Madness as a Method * 5. Phase V: Confusing the British * B. LESSONS LEARNED * 1. Adapt to Survive * 2. Economize * 3. Withdraw and Recuperate * 4. Memorize the Terrain * 5. Lead from the Front * 6. Go Small * 7. Remember Nature * 8. Simulate Ubiquity * 9. Maximize Available Weapons Technology * 10. Protect Morale * C. THE IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE * CHAPTER V * OTTO SKORZENY * A. BACKGROUND AND EARLY CAREER * B. ADVANCEMENT * C. OPERATION OAK * 1. Analysis * 2. Importance * D. OPERATION PANZERFAUST * 1. The Mission * 2. The Plan * E. SIMILARITIES * 1. Operation Oak: Psychological Disarmament * 2. Panzerfaust: Strength through Restraint * F. INSPIRATIONS * G. A NECESSARY OPTION * CHAPTER VI * FRIEDRICH AUGUST FREIHERR VON DER HEYDTE * A. BACKGROUND * B. CENTRAL IDEAS * 1. The Purpose of Irregular Warfare * 2. Challenges to International Law and Combination Warfare * 3. Reasons for Employment * 4. The Guerrilla's Objective
